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 1 
Post-human families? Dog-human relations in the domestic sphere 
 
I begin this paper with 3 contrasting views on dogs and the practices whereby 
their lives are entangled with those of humans. In his memoir, Sleeping with 
Dogs, Brian Sewell writes of Penny, the dog with whom he had ‘grown from boy 
to man’.  
 
She had never been my toy, nor had there been anything of the 
brotherliness of my relationship with Prince, nor did I ever think of her as 
an adopted child satisfying a frustrated parental urge; she was my dog 
and we were man and dog in a primeval bond, and that was that – though 
I believe that I was a kinder and more considerate boy for having her, and 
a more compassionate man. (Sewell 2013: 25)  
 
In this passage Sewell asserts a connection which recognises the differences 
between dogs and humans and involves compassion, kindness and consideration 
– positive qualities that are a direct outcome of closeness between him and his 
dog. He also criticises the idea that dogs can be commodities (therefore 
disposable) or substitute children.  
 
The other views appear in the Huffington Post and take opposing positions on the 
relationship between companion animals and their humans: one takes exception 
to the idea that humans are ‘parents’ to ‘pets’ while the other sees nothing wrong 
with it. Steven Kurlander asserts that, ‘It’s really stupid to equate parenting with 
pet ownership…… Pets, and animals too, are not humans, and should not be 
considered or treated as such’ (Kurlander 2015). Marie Carter, in contrast, 
argues that ‘Our pets should be classified as members of our family and not 
bundled in with the rest of our property. We are pet parents and not pet owners, 
after all!’ (Carter 2015). Kurlander objects to the humanising of animals and 
asserts that the pet-human relationship is one of ownership rather than 
parenting. Carter, in contrast, asserts that it is time this legal definition was 
overturned; she backs up her argument with evidence that people regard their 
pets as members of their families.  
 
In this paper I address some of the issues raised in these extracts. I explore the 
ways in which dogs and other companion speciesi become family members and 
engage with the argument that this indicates the emergence of post-human 
families. In order to do this I first review the literature on families and 
companion animals, situating it in the context of an increasing interest in the 
post-human. I then ask what a post-human family would look like and whether it 
makes sense to talk in such terms, before presenting my own empirical data on 
the ways in which humans and dogs live with each other and the ‘daily practices 
of kinship’ which constitute them as kin (Charles and Davies 2011: 89). Finally I 




There is an increasing interest in post-humanism as a philosophical approach 
which challenges both Humanism and the meaning of the category ‘human’. It is 
particularly influential amongst researchers exploring human-animal and 
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human-technology relations (see for e.g. Haraway 2008) and can broadly be 
understood as a displacement of the centrality of the human and a recognition 
that the non-human is an essential part of (post)-human life. This approach 
challenges anthropocentrism and the idea that humans are superior to and 
different from all other living creatures. It also unsettles those disciplines which 
look at human activities as if they take place in a purely human sphere. Sociology 
is no exception: for most of the 20th century it took society as its focus without 
recognising that animals are incorporated into social relations with humans, that 
‘human’ societies would not have developed in the way they have if this had not 
been the case (Shipman 2011), and that the anthropocentric social relations in 
which animals are entangled systematically disadvantage them (Carter and 
Charles 2013). It also regarded families as purely human affairs.  
 
Post-humanist approaches to families, in contrast, recognise that animals are 
integral to many families and ask whether the emergence of post-human kinship 
relations can be identified empirically. Thus scholars have suggested that the 
existence of multi-species households and the increasingly widespread practice 
of ‘pet keeping’ in post-industrial societies are indicative of a shift to post-human 
sensibilities and kinship practices (Franklin 1999; Cudworth 2011). There has 
undoubtedly been a rise in popularity of pet-keeping and, to take dogs as an 
example, the dog population in the UK almost doubled from 4.4 to 8.4 million 
between 1963 and 2016  (Franklin 1999:89; PFMA, 2016). There has also been a 
move towards keeping animals inside rather than outside the house and it is now 
commonplace for dogs to share intimate spaces within the home including beds 
(Thomson et al 2014). And even though households with children at home are 
more likely than other types of household to include companion animals, 
anthropomorphism and levels of attachment to these animals are higher in 
single-person households and those where children have left home (Hart, 1995). 
 
There is also a growing body of research showing that companion animals are 
increasingly defined as family members (Charles 2014). An Australian study 
(Franklin 2006) found that 88% of respondents ascribed family status to their 
companion animals while in the US the proportion is 91% (Harris 2011). 
Qualitative studies have found that animals are considered family because they 
provide emotional support and because they need humans to care for them 
(Charles and Davies 2011; Power 2008). Children especially regard pets as kin 
(Tipper 2011) and recent research shows that children are ‘more likely to 
confide in pets than siblings’ (Coughlan 2015). Indeed people of all ages report 
feeling closer to their dogs than to other family members (Cohen 2002; Pew 
2006) and dogs are particularly important in providing support at levels 
‘comparable with’ that provided by ‘human relationships’ (Bonas et al 2000:232; 
Enders-Slegers 2000; Hart 1995).  
 
It is not clear, however, that an increase in pet keeping and the emotionally close 
relationships that can develop between humans and companion animals indicate 
the emergence of post-human families. Moreover, there is little agreement about 
how kinship relations can be defined as post-human. Here I look at some 
examples of how this has been attempted to tease out the different approaches. 
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Part of the argument that post-human families can be identified empirically rests 
on the alleged newness of the human-animal relations characterising 
contemporary, multi-species households. Franklin, for instance, argues that, 
since the 1970s, there has been a move to new forms of intimacy between 
humans and companion animals which results in ‘hybrid’ households (Franklin 
2006). It is, however, contentious to claim that pets being ‘companionate family 
members’ is a new phenomenon (Franklin 2006:138); there have been intimate 
connections between humans and other animals, especially dogs, for hundreds if 
not thousands of years. Indeed, ‘[i]t was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries that the farmhouse became an exclusively human residence’ and, prior 
to this ‘there was … an intimacy and interconnection between humans and 
animals (wild and domesticated) which it is now hard to comprehend’ (Benton 
1993: 73). And during the 18th century the practice of giving pets human names 
and keeping them indoors became widespread amongst the middle classes, 
especially in urban areas  (Thomas 1984). Franklin argues, however, that since 
the 1970s the family ‘has affected a significant shift from a humanist to a post-
humanist form’ (Franklin 2006:139). In similar vein, Smith writes about her 
mode of living with rabbits and her attempts to perform human-pet relations 
that are not based on dominance and subordination (Smith 2003).  
 
In Franklin’s and Smith’s studies we find two different definitions of post-human 
families: one that is based on the existence of new, ‘companionate’ relations 
between humans and animals (Franklin 2006) and the other that explores the 
possibility of performing human-animal relations so that the needs of both 
species are met (Smith 2003). These ways of understanding human relations 
with companion animals are part of an attempt to grasp changes in human-
animal relations which are said to be characteristic of post-modernity (Franklin 
1999). It is argued that we are now in an era where human exceptionalism is 
being challenged, a more emotional attachment between humans and other 
animals is emerging and that this is reflected in family practices. For Franklin, 
the claim that companion animals are family indicates both a breakdown in the 
species barrier and the ‘surrogacy of animals for significant human relationships’ 
(Franklin 2006: 142).  
 
Power builds on these understandings of post-human households, distinguishing 
between humanist and ‘more-than-human’ ‘models of family’ (Power 2008: 541). 
For her, humanist models shape and mould dogs to fit in; dogs are either 
incorporated into families within a caring, parental relationship or as pack 
members and, in either case, relations of dominance and subordination prevail. 
The ‘more-than-human’ model entails an accommodation of the ‘dogginess of 
canine companions’ (Power 2008: 541) with dogs actively participating in the 
‘everyday practices’ of family and thereby contributing to the shaping of home 
(Power 2008: 536). It also involves a change in everyday practices of kinship 
such that ‘both people and dogs [are] altered’ and their needs are catered for 
(Power 2008: 552). For Power, dogs are incorporated into families as dogs 
rather than because they are seen as ‘furry humans’ but the ways in which this is 
accomplished both reinforces and challenges anthropocentrism; it therefore 
does not necessarily mean a ‘post-humanist abandonment of binaries’, although 
it may trouble them (Charles and Davies 2011: 73).  
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Such troubling is associated with companion animals occupying a liminal space, 
sometimes being regarded as human and sometimes animal (Fox 2006).  When 
they are regarded as animals they become disposable and a dog may be ejected 
from the family if domestic circumstances change or they behave in ways that 
humans deem to be unacceptable (Power 2008). This not only sits awkwardly 
with their status as kin (Fudge 2008:109) but also renders that status 
provisional (Shir-Vertesh 2012) and reveals the power differentials 
characterising human-animal relationships (Power 2008). Similarly, it has been 
argued that while pets are grievable they are replaceable, thus confirming their 
ambiguous status as both human and non-human and how they ‘can be regarded 
as persons included in a human moral community while human exceptionalism 
remains intact’ (Redmalm 2015: 32).  
 
Emerging from these discussions are 3 arguments that are important for the 
question of whether we are witnessing the emergence of post-human families: 
(1) that close connections with companion animals disrupt human 
exceptionalism because companion animals occupy a liminal space between 
human and animal; they are understood as possessing ‘human’ qualities and are 
also regarded as ‘other’ and therefore unknowable. Animals’ possession of 
‘human’ qualities questions the uniqueness of these qualities as human while 
their unknowability undermines the idea of an all-knowing human subject - both, 
in different ways, question human superiority (Fudge 2008); (2) that companion 
animals are precariously incorporated into families and this precarity or 
disposability reveals the power relations underpinning their incorporation and 
the persistence of human exceptionalism (Redmalm 2015); (3) that extending 
the category of the human to include animals is merely an extension of 
humanism and does not challenge human superiority because whatever is 
included within the category ‘human’ is superior to the excluded ‘other’ 
(Braidotti 2013). From this it would seem that post-humanism does not simply 
mean multi-species households, if it did there would be no question that 
increasing numbers of families in western societies are post-human. More 
importantly it means establishing relations with companion animals that are not 
based on a human-other distinction. In what follows I argue that practices of 
kinship blur the human-animal boundary, that this blurring takes place in the 
context of unequal power relations which are an inevitable consequence of dogs’ 
incorporation into families as dependents (Carter and Charles 2013; Smith 2003; 
Power 2008), and that, although post-human kinship practices can be identified, 
it is not clear that they give rise to a post-human form of family. 
 
The study 
To develop this argument I draw on two sets of data: responses to a Mass 
Observation directive on Animals and Humans which was sent out in the 
summer of 2009, and 21 interviews carried out with people who shared their 
domestic space with companion animals. The Mass Observation Project is based 
at the University of Sussex, UK. It was established in 1937 and its present 
incarnation dates from 1981. A panel of around 500 correspondentsii respond to 
3 directives a year which prompt them to write about different topics based on 
their own experiences and observation. It is ‘part history project, part 
anthropology, part auto/biography and part social commentary’ and is written 
by ‘ordinary people’ rather than experts (Sheridan et al 2000: 12). Responses are 
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housed in the Mass Observation Archive in Sussex. In the summer of 2009 a 
directive called ‘Animals and Humans’ was sent out and in this paper I draw on 
the 244 responses. Two thirds were from women and one third from men with 
the ages of correspondents ranging from 16 to 90; this reflects the composition 
of the MO panel at the time (MO 2009). I subsequently (over an 8-month period 
between 2011 and 2012) conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with 19 
women and 12 men whose ages ranged from the early 20s to 80. Interviewees 
were contacted through a veterinary practice, the Dog’s Trust (a national shelter 
for homeless dogs), Guide Dogs for the Blind and by means of a snowballing 
sample in a local city. In the interviews, which were semi-structured, I followed 
up issues that had been raised in the responses to the Animals and Humans 
directive, focussing particularly on what it is that makes animals family.  
 
Kinship practices 
One of the ways in which animals become family is through practices of care 
(Power 2008; Charles and Davies 2011). Indeed the wellbeing of companion 
animals ‘is acknowledged to be an object of direct moral obligation on the part of 
human members of the household’ (Benton 1993: 64). Caring involves 
responsibility for another living being and this sense of responsibility 
contributed to animals becoming family members. One of the correspondents to 
the MO directive wrote about the difference between a pet and other animals: 
 
A pet is different from other animals because it usually shares your home 
and garden and is part of your everyday life. Also you are responsible for 
it – you have to care for it and feed it and take care of its health. (J1890, F) 
 
The idea that having responsibility for another living being and having to care for 
them was what made them family was widely echoed in the interviews. This 
responsibility meant that the needs of an animal had to be taken into account. 
One woman, for instance, spoke about the dog they had when the children were 
small.  
 
[He] was almost like a third child in a way I suppose because he grew up 
with them, the two children and him, and … when we went out we would 
still have to think about where he went and if he came with us or not. 
(K005) 
 
He became ‘like a third child’ not in the sense that he was a child substitute but in 
the sense that his needs as well as those of the children had to be catered for in 
family arrangements. Others spoke about changing their holiday practices once a 
dog became part of their family.  
 
And, you know, before with just the two of us and obviously no children at 
home you could just pretty much do what you wanted when you wanted, 
but obviously with a dog you can’t. And actually we were saying, you 
know, it would be quite nice next time we go abroad, you know, maybe to 
take him with us and that would mean getting the ferry and driving which 
we haven’t, wouldn’t normally do because obviously that takes time and 
it’s not quite so easy, but we think we’d do that. Because he is part of the 
family really so he should be with us as it were, not all the time but if 
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possible. And we’ve certainly had a couple of short breaks away where we 
deliberately chose to go somewhere where dogs are accepted… . (K002M) 
 
The responsibility of caring for a dog, the need to take another living being’s 
needs into account, and the simple fact that many people prefer to go on holiday 
with rather than without their dogs, changes their family practices so that they 
become inclusive of their canine family member.  
 
The dependence of dogs led some to draw analogies between them and children 
and suggests that there are elements of a parental relationship between humans 
and their dogs (Power 2008).  
 
Dog parents? 
That the relationship can be understood as parentaliii is supported by evidence 
that dogs could fill the gap created when children left home. One woman wrote 
that with her children gone she felt ‘very lonely’ and ‘decided it would be nice to 
have a dog for company’. She recounted the story of how two poodles came to 
live with her and then said: 
 
The three of us were very happy for about 10 years. We all used to go to 
bed together. They slept together by the side of my bed. We were all the 
best of friends. … When they got very ill and their lives came to an end it 
was two of the saddest days of my life. I had as much love for those little 
dogs as I did for my children. (S496, F)  
 
In this case the dogs may have been surrogate children but others made it clear 
that even though their children leaving home had resulted in a changed 
relationship with their dogs, the dogs had not taken the children’s place. One 
woman told me how, when her children grew up and left home, there was a shift 
in the relationships in her family with the dogs moving up the hierarchy (cf Fox 
2006).  
 
I mean perhaps not they become more of the family but they almost 
become your, I think you have to be careful they don’t become too much 
your children in a way, I think it shifts a little bit when you’ve only got the 
dogs because when the children were living at home all the time the dogs 
were beneath the children and I think once the children had gone they 
come up a level actually in your thinking. (K005) 
 
Care is taken here not to position the dogs as substitute children. This is also 
apparent in the practices surrounding birthdays and Christmas.  
 
[W]e don’t mark their birthdays at all, Christmas they usually get one 
present, a chew or something wrapped up, I think we started that with 
Tom [dog] really and we’ve ended up, I think because of the children and 
it was always, but certainly no, we didn’t mark birthdays, I think that’s 
part of them not being, I don’t know, I mean I’m sure people do but we’ve 
never done. … They’re dogs. (K005) 
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Practices, however, varied considerably. One woman recounted the lengths she 
had gone to in order to estimate her rescue dog’s birthday so that it could be 
celebrated, and another heterosexual couple told me that they gave all their 
animals birthday cards. 
 
These practices incorporate dogs into families as dependents for whom adults 
have responsibility in a way analogous to children but many stressed that dogs 
are valued because they are dogs and several said that they preferred dogs to 
children. 
 
I think it’s part of the family group, but I think it’s still important that 
they’re dogs and they’re not children, but they still have an important role 
but in a different way, I don’t hold with all this, you know all this stuff of 
putting, I don’t know, these clothes on, all - these funny things that make 
them not dogs. (K005M) 
 
This relationship which is one of responsibility for another creature who is 
dependent on you implies that ‘differentials of power and dependency are 
intrinsic to the relation between a pet-owner and a pet’ (Benton 1993: 146). 
Indeed, as Tuan argues, pet-owner relationships share similarities with parent-
child relationships in so far as both are marked by dominance and affection 
(Tuan 1984).  
 
Blurring boundaries 
It could be argued that in order for families to be considered post-human, these 
power differentials between companion animals and their humans would need 
to be challenged and the distinction between human and other animals, which 
reinforces human superiority, questioned. But to what extent is a lack of 
distinction reflected in the way humans relate to dogs who are family members? 
Are dogs regarded as similar to their human companions or is the relation one of 
difference? And if it is one of difference does this imply human domination? The 
dependency of dogs and the requirement, both practical and moral, that they are 
cared for appropriately, suggests that although they are family members they 
occupy a subordinate position. The situation is, however, subtle and nuanced. 
One woman wrote that her dog was not the equal of her husband and herself, 
and yet she also writes of the dog owning their shared home. 
 
We just have the one dog who we share our home with, although actually 
he seems to be the owner. He has the run of the house with the exceptions 
of the bedrooms and bathrooms …. The relationship is different than that 
of mine to my husband, we try to treat each other as equals and certainly 
the dog is not that. (P1796, F)  
 
This implies an ambivalence about the relative status of humans and dogs; in 
some ways they are not equal while in other ways they are like the ‘owner’, a 
reference, perhaps, to how caring for the needs of another may also be akin to 
serving them. Indeed, she writes at the end of her response that her ‘eldest son 
does get quite cross with us sometimes for the way we treat Dillon he says but 
Mum he’s only a dog!’ (P1796, F). Their treatment of the dog, in the eyes of their 
son, elevates his status, i.e. it raises him up the family hierarchy, which their son 
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thinks is inappropriate. There is also an implication that he thinks his parents 
are humanising Dillon. 
 
It has been argued that anthropomorphism is essential for meaningful 
relationships to have developed between humans and animals (Serpell 2005) 
and it is certainly the case that people attribute so-called human characteristics 
to their dogs and other companion animals (Sanders 1999). However there is 
great care taken by both the MO correspondents and the interviewees to 
distance themselves from anthropomorphism, part of which involves keeping a 
distance – physical and emotional - between humans and animals.  
 
For one of the MO correspondents, it was important to maintain the human-
animal distinction and she did this by having her dogs sleep outside.  
 
They [the dogs] are allowed in the house (but not upstairs). However, 
they sleep in an outhouse/ stable block. They are happier not being in a 
stuffy house; their coats are thick and glossy – and the distinction is 
maintained between animals and humans. (M3412, F) 
 
This supports the idea that animals sharing intimate spaces with humans 
challenges species boundaries. Interviewees reported their attempts not to let 
dogs get on chairs or beds in an effort to maintain the human-animal distinction. 
In one interview, the blurring of boundaries was explicitly mentioned. 
 
To me it’s fairer on you and on the dog if you try and maintain that 
distinction, it can get quite - of course - particularly if you’re sort of, you 
know, sitting on the sofa and the dog’s alongside of you and you’re sort of 
stroking the dog and you find yourselves talking to the dog about what’s 
on the TV, that’s quite interesting sort of, a bit of blurring. (K002M) 
 
Clearly these family practices – watching TV together and commenting on the 
programme – blurred the animal-human boundary which this interviewee was 
keen to maintain. This was also apparent when the same couple were asked 
whether they ever gave or received cards on behalf of the dog. He said that they 
did not but she reminded him – saying ‘liar, liar, pants on fire!’ – that he had in 
fact given her a card on her recent birthday signed from the dog. There is a clear 
feeling that such practices could be judged as being of dubious moral value and 
that it may be better not to admit to them, precisely because they blur the 
boundary between dog and human.  
 
By the same token, efforts to avoid what is seen as anthropomorphism were not 
always effective. The same couple reported that they had tried to avoid a human 
name for their dog because ‘it’s not a human … and yet we ended up choosing 
Dylan but it just seemed right’ (K002M). The man went on to stress that although 
the dog was part of the family he was not human.  
 
He’s one of the family but he’s not a human. … He’s a dog, yeah, I mean I 
think that’s quite important to keep that distinction because I think if you 
treat him as a dog he will be happier and he will fit into the family better. 
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He’s not a human and I think that’s quite an important distinction. 
(K002M) 
 
They wanted to ‘respect him as a dog and not [try] to make him something he 
isn’t’ (K002M). This entails respect for his dog-ness and could be seen as 
displaying a post-human sensibility. On the other hand it could be seen as a 
rationalisation of their relationship with their dog in light of the perceived moral 
disapprobation attracted by the admission of too close a relationship with 
companion animals and the blurring of boundaries that he has already admitted 
to in their kinship practices. This sort of response was more common in 
interviews than in the written MO responses where there was more openness 
about the intimacy of relationships with companion animals (Charles 2016).  
 
Many, however, maintained an uncompromising belief in human superiority. One 
MO correspondent, for instance, commenting on the idea that a dog is a person’s 
best friend, wrote: 
 
I regard humans as being superior to animals – so given the choice of a 
dog or a man as my best friend – it will be the man. (C3603, M) 
 
There were differing views about the superiority of humans over dogs but many 
recognised that family practices could either reinforce or blur the dog-human 
boundary. Keeping a dog outside reinforces boundaries while letting them on the 
settee blurs them. And in the interviews especially people were at pains to 
distance themselves from anthropomorphism. There seems to be a difference 
between what is publicly acceptable and practices that go on in private, 
reminiscent of Cornwell’s distinction between public and private accounts 
(Cornwell 1984), and while kinship practices often blurred the human-animal 
boundary, in their public accounts many interviewees claimed to be maintaining 
it.  
 
Selfhood and agency 
One of the things that disrupts the category human is evidence that animals 
share many qualities that have been defined as uniquely human. Thus it is 
argued that dogs (and other animals) ‘have elements of a core self that becomes 
present to us through interaction with them’ (Irvine 2004:3).iv They are seen as 
‘having a mind, beliefs, and desires, just as we do’ (Irvine 2009: 332) and, 
because they ‘have agency and the other dimensions of the core self, they can 
choose courses of action’ (Irvine 2009: 337). Dogs are related to as ‘quasi-
persons’ (Benton 1993); they are individuated, experienced as actors exercising 
agency and as having an understanding of other creatures’ intentionality. This 
way of engaging with animals can be understood as post-human in so far as so-
called human characteristics are not confined to biologically human beings and 
was a characteristic of the descriptions of dog-human interactions in my 
samples. 
 
In these descriptions dogs appeared as individuals with distinct characters and 
personalities which were observed in detail. One interviewee talked about his 
dog’s personality with the following words: laidback, calm, friendly, mischievous, 
inquisitive, playful, obedient, stubborn - terms which could just as easily be 
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applied to a human person (K002M) and which are ‘vitality affects’, ‘important 
vehicles of the core self’ (Irvine 2009:335). Another interviewee described Mollie 
who, 
 
was old, cantankerous … did what she liked, … she was not a dog, she 
thought she was human. (K001M) 
 
The idea that Mollie ‘thought she was human’ implies that she had human 
characteristics and perhaps was entitled to be treated as a human. It also points 
to the liminal spaces that companion animals can occupy, being neither human 
nor animal or being human and animal at different times (cf Fox 2006). Referring 
to animals as ‘almost human’ operates in a similar way. One woman wrote about 
animals wanting to do everything that human family members do and, in the 
process, becoming ‘almost human’. 
 
Animals that you love are definitely part of the family. They just gradually 
become part of the family so that in the end they are almost human! They 
want to do everything that you do and even sometimes to share your bed! 
(J1890, F). 
 
Some suggested that it was because dogs had characters and personalities, that is 
they were persons, that they were part of the family. One MO correspondent 
wrote about the pets she lived with as a child: 
 
They might not have been equal members of the family but they were still 
part of it. … my family and I have often felt that our pets have been part of 
our family. However this has only really happened with our larger pets, 
i.e. our cats and dogs. I don’t know why this is, probably because you get 
more of a reaction from them and they all seem to have their own 
characters. (G3988. F)  
 
This comment alerts us to the importance of an animal’s ability to respond. Their 
ability to communicate is an aspect of their personhood and an indication of the 
interior life that many who live with dogs and other animals recognise (Fudge 
2008).  
 
Many not only experienced dogs as persons in their own right but also as having 
a sense of self. Irvine argues that a sense of self requires agency which ‘implies 
subjectivity, in that an agentic being… has desires, wishes, and intentions, along 
with a sense of having those things’ (Irvine, 2009:332). There were many reports 
of dogs shaping interactions with their humans. This was commented on by a 
woman who had a small, rescue dog, Danny. 
 
He’s got to be with you. I mean if you’re sitting having your breakfast in 
the kitchen he’s got to be on your lap which is a blooming nuisance when 
you’re trying to eat breakfast, say ‘no Danny wait’ and then he bumps you 
with his nose if he doesn’t get your attention. No, he’s got to be on your 
lap which is very strange but, oh no, so he has to go out for his walk now, 
‘no, I’m having my breakfast, you just wait’. (K011) 
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This quote points to the active engagement of dogs with their human 
companions in order to get what they want and supports the claim that they 
have a sense of self which involves agency, intentionality and mind (Irvine 2004). 
This small dog ‘bumps you with his nose if he doesn’t get your attention’ and 
insists on being on his human’s lap when she is eating breakfast even though this 
is something that she finds a nuisance. There were many examples like this, in 
both the written responses and in the interviews. Several interviewees spoke 
about how their dogs did not like it when voices were raised; this usually 
resulted in them trying not to have arguments in front of their dog and, in some 
cases, dogs would intervene in order to stop the argument (see Carter and 
Charles 2013).  
 
This suggests that dogs have desires and wishes that they make known. They are 
active agents in their engagements with their human companions though they 
exercise this agency in the context of social relations which place them as 




Fudge argues that relationships with pets are ‘potentially compassionate’ and 
that imagination is required to feel compassion for another living being (Fudge 
2008:67). This is reminiscent of the ideology of kindness which emerged in 19th 
century America as a means of civilising children; ensuring that they were kind 
to animals was one way of doing this (Grier 2006). It has also been argued that 
the connection with animals has contributed to the development of qualities 
such as ‘compassion, empathy and communication skills’ and that they are 
endangered when humans do not live with animals (Shipman 2011:275). The 
view that animals make ‘us’ better people was expressed by MO correspondents 
and interviewees as well as Sewell who was quoted at the beginning of this 
paper.  
 
I love animals! I think they are vital as family pets and teach us a lot about 
love, loyalty and responsibility. (M3412, F, 50) 
 
As well as making humans better people, dogs often provided emotional support 
which is one of the elements that constitutes kinship (Charles and Davies 2011). 
A young man wrote: 
 
In my late twenties I went through some mental and physical trouble 
which I tried to hide from my family. But I used to talk to Sandy [his dog] 
about my issues and she saw the real me. I think she knew I wasn’t very 
well at the time. I lost interest in life and my well being for a few years but 
my devotion to her never wavered. Her love back was unstinting as 
always – I keep a picture of her in my bedroom. (H3784, M) 
 
Here we have the idea that Sandy knows him better than his human family does 
– ‘she saw the real me’ -- a view which was echoed in other accounts. And a man 
who had separated from his wife wrote about the support he got from his dog. 
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The best relationship I ever had with an animal was my dog. … He helped 
me get over the break up of my marriage just by being around while it 
was all happening… Relationships with animals are different from those 
with people because you can rarely trust people absolutely. You always 
know what a dog is thinking. Dogs have no hidden agenda. (M4463, M) 
 
There is also evidence in these accounts that animals feel an emotional 
connection to their humans. The young man above talked about Sandy’s love for 
him and another man recounted a heartrending story of how a German Shepherd 
who had accompanied him and his wife on a move from Latin America to Britain 
subsequently pined to death. ‘Sadly’ the writer moved to a new posting in the Far 
East and had to leave the dog behind with his mother.  
 
I was told that the moment my wife and son left the house he lay beside 
some luggage we had left behind and simply gave up on life, dead within 
the month. I have since grieved over the death of that same child, but 
scarcely more deeply than I did, and do, over Lucky. (R2143, M)  
 
Such understandings of dogs loving their humans are supported by scientific 
research which makes it difficult to dismiss them as anthropomorphism. 
Ethologists have shown that dogs form affective bonds with particular humans 
which demonstrates the ‘reciprocal nature of human-animal interactions’ (Topal 
and Gacsi 2012: 182). Furthermore, they suggest that families are  ‘mixed-
species groups [which] should be regarded as natural entities. Attachment 
between dogs and their caregivers is an indispensable characteristic of this social 
system that has a bi-directional nature’ (Topal and Gacsi 2012: 181).  
 
Emotional connection means not only that dogs pine and die because their 
people leave them but also that people grieve when dogs die. One of the MO 
correspondents wrote: 
 
Dogs especially can easily become part of the family and it is for this 
reason that we can sometimes grieve so much when they go to the great 
lamppost in the sky. We talk to them, we understand their thoughts and 
intentions in the same way that they often understand ours, and some 
people (my late father included) allow them to share the bed (on top of 
the blankets, I hasten to add) and lick their faces. (D1602, M) 
 
But as well as grieving a dog’s death, people may also get another dog. This is 
understood by some as indicating that dogs are replaceable and that this 
contradicts their status as family members. For many, however, an individual 
dog is not replaceable; it may as well be argued that someone whose human 
partner dies and subsequently re-partners is replacing them. The fact that a 
human partner is ‘replaced’ does not make that partner any less human but, in 
the case of dogs, it is said to demonstrate their liminal status (Redmalm, 2015). 
Moreover dogs are often not ‘replaceable’ as this man’s response indicates. 
 
Our family had a dog (a nondescript mongrel) when I was a lad. Officially 
it was my sister’s dog – but I spent most time with it. I talk [sic] it walks 
on a daily basis – and fed it. Sadly, it started to have fits – and had to be 
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put down. I took it on its last walk to the vets. Although that was over 50 
years ago – I still remember the anguish I felt.  
 
It was so horrible to be parted from ‘Scamp’ that I have never owned a 
dog since then. I love dogs – but cannot bear the thought that they don’t 
live for ever. (C3603, M) 
 
Furthermore, there were examples of dogs ‘replacing’ humans who have died 
which seems to have happened in the following case.  
 
When I was growing up my mother had 2 pugs – Poppy and her less 
appealing son Percy. Poppy had been given to my mother to cheer her up 
after the death of my older sister and she, the pug, was an incredibly 
important member of the family…. Poppy lived to 17 which is very old for 
a pug. My siblings and I were on holiday with my father when she died 
and we were all devastated – even my father. She is buried in the orchard 
at my childhood home – it was one of the things my mother most minded 
about when she sold the house. (A3434, F)    
 
Here the emotional attachment to the dog can be seen not only as an attachment 
to her but as a connection with the dead daughter and the selling of the house is 
so upsetting because it symbolises the severing of that connection.  
 
Sometimes dogs are expendable even though they are part of the family. This is 
explained in terms of the relationship with them being different from the 
relationship with a human family member.  
 
In a sense our animals were an extension of the family, but always 
secondary to it and when the dachshund developed incontinent [sic] 
problems, there was no question that she had to go, since the safety of our 
two young children was paramount. Of course it is a different 
relationship. (W2322, M, 65) 
 
And, as a cursory glance at a dog rescue site will show, changed family 
circumstances are often the reason that dogs are looking for new homes. But 
often they are not expendable, even when they are difficult. As one interviewer 
said: 
 
[Y]ou can’t choose your family, you can choose your friends and it’s a bit 
like that with, well, certainly with Flo … she’s a nightmare but that’s our 
responsibility. (K001M) 
 
Flo was family and was not expendable. But, despite the adage of not choosing 
your family, there is evidence that people do choose who counts as family and 
that ‘the boundaries between relationships that are ‘given’, in terms of 
consanguineal and/or affinal links, and those that are ‘chosen’ are not 
necessarily salient in understanding how definitions of family and kin are 
constructed’ (Charles and Davies 2011:88). So replaceability and expendability 
may not only be applicable to animals but when experienced by humans do not 




The evidence that emerges from these written and spoken accounts shows that 
the practices through which dogs are incorporated into families are 
contradictory and variable. While caring practices incorporate dogs into families 
as dependants and analogies are drawn between dogs and children who never 
grow up, dogs are not necessarily regarded as surrogate children. However, the 
analogy alerts us to the context of unequal power relations which structure 
relations of care; children and dogs are dependent on and subordinate to adult 
family members. Secondly, although kinship practices blur the boundaries 
between human and animal, people recognise that dogs are both like and not like 
humans and, in attempting to avoid anthropomorphism, often reassert the 
human-animal binary. Thirdly dogs respond to humans and engage actively in 
relationships with them. This disrupts the species barrier because animals are 
experienced as having capacities which have hitherto been defined as 
quintessentially human. And the establishing of relationships with other animals 
makes humans better people – kinder and more compassionate. So the issues 
raised at the beginning of this chapter are present in the way people talk and 
write about their relationships with dogs: a relationship of care and 
responsibility, a distinction between humans and animals that is blurred in the 
practices of sharing domestic spaces, efforts to maintain that distinction by 
resisting anthropomorphism, and both respecting the dog-ness of dogs and 
asserting the superiority of humans. 
 
So where does this leave the idea of post-human families? Earlier I suggested 
that there were 3 arguments to consider when reflecting on whether families 
could be characterised as post-human: (1) that kinship practices involving 
companion animals disrupt the human-animal binary; (2) that dogs and other 
animals are precariously incorporated into families; and (3) that extending the 
category human to certain categories of animals does not challenge human 
exceptionalism and cannot be characterised as post-human. The first argument, 
that human-animal boundaries are blurred by many of the practices involved in 
sharing a home with dogs, is supported by my data. These practices can be seen 
as post-human because they undermine the human-animal binary and associated 
notions of human superiority. The second argument, that dogs’ replaceability 
means that human exceptionalism remains intact, has been shown to be 
problematic because the notion of replaceability can be applied to humans as 
well as animals and if it is used only with reference to animals it reinforces the 
human-animal binary. The third argument appears not to be relevant for 
understanding cross-species kinship practices. This is because boundaries are 
blurred rather than shifted and, although dogs share many human characteristics 
and may be regarded as ‘almost human’,  their difference is recognised and 
respected. They are not incorporated into families as ‘furry humans’ (cf. Power, 
2008). 
 
This evidence shows that kinship practices construct a world where dogs and 
humans are part of the same social group. Some of these practices can be 
understood as post-human in the sense that they blur the human-animal 
boundary but they exist alongside others which reinforce it. It is therefore 
difficult to conclude that a post-human family form can be identified empirically. 
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Perhaps it is more fruitful to recognise that taking a post-humanist approach 
enables us to identify those kinship practices that disrupt the idea that there is a 
clear boundary between humans and other animals. It shows that the reality of 
entangled lives is messy and categories of separation are difficult to uphold in 
the daily practices of domestic life even when attempts are made to do so. In this 
way it highlights the instability of the category human and alerts us both to the 
deep connections between humans and other animals and to the power 
differentials that underpin human-dog relations, even when they are loved as 
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i In this paper I use the terms ‘companion animal’ and ‘pet’ interchangeably. I 
also use the terms ‘animal’, ‘other animals’ and ‘non-human animals’ 
interchangeably. A discussion of terminology and my reasons for this usage can 
be found in Charles and Davies, 2008: footnote 2 and Charles, 2016.   
ii This is the term used by the Mass Observation Project to refer to panel 
members and I follow this usage here.  
iii It is important to note that idioms of kinship and friendship are often used to 
describe close relationships with animals without necessarily suggesting a 
straightforward equivalence (Charles, 2014).  
iv Irvine, in her ethnographic study of an animal shelter in the US, argues both 
that people gain a sense of self and identity through their interactions with 
companion animals and that the way dogs interact with their human companions 
suggests the existence of a core self (Irvine, 2004). Her argument that a sense of 
self is constructed through interactions between humans and their companion 
animals is analogous to arguments made about how a sense of self is formed in 
interaction with human others although she does not claim that dogs’ sense of 
self is developed to the same extent as it is in adult humans. The question of 
whether dogs and other animals have a sense of self is, however, contentious. 
Thus Jerolmack takes issue with Irvine’s position, arguing that we do not need to 
claim inter-subjectivity to be able to explain the mutual interactions of humans 
and animals (Jerolmack, 2009), while Ingold argues that it is better to talk about 
inter-agentivity when conceptualising the interactions between human and 
animal others because this encompasses the whole embodied being rather than 
prioritising the engagement of minds (Ingold, 2012).  
 
